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THE DEEPFAKE DILEMMA: RECONCILING PRIVACY AND FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

Shannon Reid
INTRODUCTION
Deepfakes are realistic videos created using artificial intelligence software
to replace the face of one person with the face of another.1 The technology
used to produce these fake videos or digital representations is becoming
increasingly sophisticated and available to the masses.2 Since their creation by
an anonymous Reddit user in late 2017,3 deepfakes have challenged the
effectiveness of U.S. law at punishing those who publish deepfakes of others
without their consent. While deepfakes are often utilized as comedic or
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Shannon Reid is a 2020 graduate of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. She focuses her
practice on labor and employment law and has legal research experience in the areas of privacy and
government investigations.
See Sierra Lyda,“Deepfakes” Technology and Pornography Laws , N.C. J.L. & TECH. (Feb. 14,
2018), htttp://ncjolt.org/deepfakes-technology-pornography-laws/ (describing the open-source
“machine learning” technology used to create deepfakes); see also Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron,
Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security , 107 CALIF. L.
REV. 1753, 1757 (2019) (defining deep fakes as “the full range of hyper-realistic digital falsification of
images, video, and audio”).
See Grace Shao & Evelyn Cheng, The Chinese Face-Swapping App That Went Viral Is Taking the
Danger of ‘Deepfake’ to the Masses , CNBC (Jan. 17, 2020, 2:50 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/04/chinese-face-swapping-app-zao-takes-dangers-of-deepfake-to-themasses.html (discussing how “[a] face-swapping app that surged to the top of China’s domestic
download rankings has raised concerns about how fabricated but realistic-looking videos may be
breaking into the mainstream”).
See Samantha Cole, AI-Assisted Fake Porn is Here and We’re All Fucked, VICE (Dec. 11, 2017,
2:18 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gydydm/gal-gadot-fake-ai-porn (discussing deepfake
technology with the creator); see also Meredith Somers, Deepfakes, Explained, MIT
SLOAN (July 21, 2020), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/deepfakesexplained#:~:text=The%20term%20%E2%80%9Cdeepfake%E2%80%9D%20was%20first,open%2
0source%20face%2Dswapping%20technology (“The term ‘deepfake’ was first coined in late 2017 by
a Reddit user of the same name[.]”).
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satirical tools,4 around the world, deepfakes are also being used to humiliate
and harass individuals. The latter, more harmful use leads to detrimental
consequences for those targeted.
Rana Ayyub, an investigative journalist in India, became a target of this
practice when a deepfake sex video showing her face on another woman’s
body was circulated on the Internet in April 2018.5 It was spread via Facebook,
Twitter, and WhatsApp, and it was sometimes sent with rape threats and her
home address.6 Ayyub stated that she “endured online harassment for
years[,]” but she found the deepfake “uniquely visceral, invasive and cruel.”7
Ayyub threw up when she saw the video, cried for days afterward, and was
ultimately rushed to the hospital, “overwhelmed with anxiety.”8 In reflecting
upon the physical, mental, and emotional harm the video caused her, she
stated that the video “is a lot more intimidating than a physical threat. [It] has
a lasting impact on your mind. And there’s nothing that could prevent it from
happening to me again.”9
Unfortunately, Rana Ayyub is not alone. Celebrities, such as Scarlett
Johansson, are often targets of deepfake creators.10 The technology is being
used to “take the face of one real person (like a celebrity) and splice it onto
the body of another (like a porn star), creating videos that lack the consent of
multiple parties.”11 In addition, political figures like Barack Obama are
depicted in incredibly realistic deepfakes speaking on important issues that
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See Casey Newton, Facebook’s Deepfakes Ban Has Some Obvious Workarounds , VERGE (Jan. 8,
2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2020/1/8/21054906/facebook-deepfakes-banloopholes-parody-satire-cheap-fakes (discussing how deepfakes created for parody and satire are
easily spread on the social media network despite a general ban against deepfakes to protect those
that did not consent to the use of their image in the creations).
Drew Harwell, Fake-Porn Videos are Being Weaponized to Harass and Humiliate Women:
‘Everybody Is a Potential Target ,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/30/fake-porn-videos-are-being-weaponizedharass-humiliate-women-everybody-is-potential-target/ (describing the plight of Ayyub after she was
featured in a deepfake without her consent).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (discussing the plight of celebrities in battling fake online videos).
David Greene, We Don’t Need New Laws for Faked Videos, We Already Have Them, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/we-dont-need-new-lawsfaked-videos-we-already-have-them.
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could easily fool the unsuspecting viewer.12 If some of the most famous and
resourceful in American society are being taken advantage of without recourse,
harm to the average U.S. citizen could be exceptional.
Moreover, the proliferation of deepfakes that spread disinformation on
matters of public interest could cripple public discourse, and, as a result,
undermine democracy.13 There are several factors that increase the threat of
deepfake disinformation in the political context. These factors include the
tendency of humans, as social creatures, to be attracted to the shocking
material that is often included in deepfakes, which drives larger audiences and
facilitates dissemination.14 There is also the fear that hysteria over fake videos
could lead people to deny legitimate video evidence or overwhelm people to
the point of “reality apathy[,]” in which one rejects all video evidence as
unreliable and maintains their previous position or affiliation.15 Thus, in
addition to the private harms resulting from deepfakes, the deepfake
technology could lead to serious public harms as well. 16
For these reasons, a comprehensive reevaluation of U.S. law is needed to
identify opportunities to strengthen the privacy protections available to those
victimized by this rapidly advancing technology. Currently, the First
Amendment is a significant challenge to the U.S. government’s ability to
regulate deepfakes because of First Amendment restrictions on limiting free
speech.17 Relatedly, deepfake creators often have a First Amendment defense
in civil claims against them. This Comment suggests that federal courts could
better balance First Amendment interests and privacy protections by
12
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See Edward Lee, Can the U.S. Government Prohibit Deepfake Videos Intended to Deceive Voters?,
FREE INTERNET PROJECT (Feb. 15, 2019), https://thefreeinternetproject.org/blog/can-usgovernment-prohibit-deepfake-videos-intended-deceive-voters (discussing Jordan Peele’s deepfake
of Barack Obama and the danger of deepfakes).
See Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, Galen Stocking, Mason Walker, & Sophia Fedeli, Many
Americans Say Made-Up News Is a Critical Problem That Needs To Be Fixed, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(June 5, 2019), https://www.journalism.org/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-acritical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/ (reporting that “[m]any Americans say the creation and
spread of made-up news and information is causing significant harm to the nation” and makes it
difficult to discern the basic facts of current events).
See Drew Harwell, Top AI researchers race to detect ‘deepfake’ videos: ‘We are outgunned ,’ WASH.
POST (June 12, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/12/top-airesearchers-race-detect-deepfake-videos-we-are-outgunned/ (discussing how the “reward structure of
the modern Web” can erode confidence in information published online).

Id.
See Chesney & Citron, supra note 1, at 1768–84 (detailing harms including, but not limited to,
exploitation, sabotage, and the undermining of public safety, diplomacy, and democratic discourse).
See infra Part II.
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recognizing a constitutional right to defend one’s personality and reputation
via the Fourteenth Amendment right of autonomy. It begins by giving an
overview of deepfake technology and U.S. law’s shortcomings in deterring the
use of nonconsensual deepfake videos. It then discusses the historical link
between U.S. common law privacy protections and the more legally
authoritative right to personality under German constitutional law. It
concludes that the two privacy regimes share historical origins in protecting
human dignity, which includes reputation and autonomy; and therefore, U.S.
courts could reasonably infer a constitutional privacy right that would rival the
First Amendment in legal actions against deepfake creators.
I. DEEPFAKE TECHNOLOGY
Deepfakes are “manipulated videos, or other digital representations
produced by sophisticated artificial intelligence, that yield fabricated images
and sounds that appear to be real.”18 Today, artificial intelligence or “AI”
refers to “machines that respond to stimulation consistent with traditional
responses from humans, given the human capacity for contemplation,
judgment, and intention.”19 Deepfake technology utilizes “deep learning,” a
subset of artificial intelligence that involves the “arrangements of algorithms
that can learn and make intelligent decisions on their own.”20 “A deep-learning
system can produce a persuasive counterfeit by studying photographs and
videos of a target person from multiple angles, and then mimicking their
person’s behavior and speech patterns.”21 Once a “preliminary fake” has been
produced, a method known as generative adversarial networks (GANs),
detects flaws in the forgery and improves them, making the fake more

18

19

20
21

Grace Shao, What ‘Deepfakes’ Are and How They May Be Dangerous , CNBC (Jan. 17, 2020, 2:47
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/what-is-deepfake-and-how-it-might-be-dangerous.html.
Darrell M. West, What Is Artificial Intelligence?, BROOKINGS (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-is-artificial-intelligence/ (citing Shukla Shubhendu S. &
Jaiswal Vijay, Applicability of Artificial Intelligence in Different Fields of Life , 1 I NT’L J. SCI. ENG’G
& RSCH. 28, 28 (2013)).
Shao, supra note 18.

Id.
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believable.22 Individuals can initiate and manage these deep learning processes
through software generally known as a “neural network.”23
While deep-learning is a significant part of how all deepfakes are created,
there are several ways in which deepfake creators can engage with the software
to manipulate images and video of the individuals they are targeting. While
some older versions of deepfake software can create convincing deepfakes by
analyzing only a few still photos of an individual’s face, newer software can
change what someone appears to be saying on video just by editing the text in
the audio-video transcript.24 Thus, as deepfake technology advances, it
becomes easier for its users to manipulate digital media.25
Once a deepfake is created, it can be disseminated easily on the Internet
and is virtually impossible to retract. Major social media and video platforms,
such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, enable deepfake creators to upload
fake videos and images for rapid dissemination to millions of other media
users around the world.26 The U.S. government has sponsored “more than a
dozen academic and corporate groups” that are conducting research on how
to detect deepfakes, but researchers say they remain “vastly overwhelmed by
a technology that they fear could herald a damaging new wave of
disinformation campaigns[.]”27 A major barrier to the development of effective
state-sponsored deepfake detection and removal tools is an asymmetry of
resources and time. According to Hany Farid, a computer-science professor
and digital-forensics expert at the University of California at Berkeley, “[w]e
are outgunned . . . [t]he number of people working on the video-synthesis side,
as opposed to the detector side, is 100 to 1.”28 Because of this resource
difficulty, top political officials are hoping that social networks and video sites
22
23

24
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28

Id. (citation omitted).
What Is a Deepfake?, ECONOMIST: THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2019/08/07/what-is-a-deepfake.
See Harwell, supra note 14 (citing Ohad Fried et al., Text-based Editing of Talking-head Video, in
38 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON GRAPHICS 1, 2 (2019)).
For a more technical explanation of deepfake technology, see Alan Zucconi, Understanding the
Technology
Behind
DeepFakes,
(Mar.
14,
2018),
https://www.alanzucconi.com/2018/03/14/understanding-the-technology-behind-deepfakes/
[https://perma.cc/L7UE-2WWF].
See Harwell, supra note 14 (discussing the government’s push to get major media platforms, such as
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, to regulate the presence of deepfakes on their sites to mitigate the
spread of malicious deepfakes online).

Id.
Id.
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will find and remove the worst fakes.29 Major tech companies, however, have
differing policies on takedowns, and some do not require that uploaded videos
be true.30 In addition, a government approach that necessitates sharing
deepfake detection software with media outlets and other parties could
potentially enable deepfake creators to “examine the code and find
workarounds.”31 For these reasons, the rapidly advancing nature of deepfakes
makes offensive use of the technology extremely difficult to combat through
physical or technical means.
II. THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT PROTECTIONS AGAINST DEEPFAKES
Unfortunately, U.S. federal and state law fails to provide a sufficient
remedy for those targeted in deepfake productions. Privacy laws fall
significantly short of targeting the technologies and behaviors posing the
greatest threats.32 And while several federal criminal and intellectual property
statutes appear to address the challenges presented by deepfakes, like U.S.
privacy law, they are narrowly applied by the courts or vulnerable to defenses
that nearly extinguish legal remedies for potential plaintiffs.

A. Tort Law
While civil privacy violations are often remedied under state tort law, the
First Amendment is a significant barrier to redress, especially if a deepfake
involves a public figure or public matter. In Pavesich v. New England, the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that:
29

30

31
32

See id. (explaining how technical and personnel difficulties leave government officials largely
unprepared to handle a large deepfake disinformation campaign or otherwise prevent malicious
deepfakes from spreading on the Internet).
See Allyson Chiu, Facebook Wouldn’t Delete an Altered Video of Nancy Pelosi. What About One
of
Mark
Zuckerberg?,
WASH.
POST
(June
12,
2019,
6:23
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/06/12/mark-zuckerberg-deepfake-facebookinstagram-nancy-pelosi/ (discussing Facebook’s takedown policy).
Harwell, supra note 14.
See Steven Chabinsky & F. Paul Pittman, USA: Data Protection Laws and Regulations 2020,
ICLG.COM (June 6, 2020), https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-protection-laws-and-regulations/usa
(detailing an exhaustive list of federal privacy protections provided by, for example, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), Fair Credit and Reporting Act (“FCRA”),
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), and Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), but
failing to document explicit federal protection for privacy invasions involving deepfakes or artificial
intelligence generally).
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[t]he right of privacy, or the right of the individual to be let alone, is a
personal right . . . . It is the complement of the right to the immunity
of one’s person. The individual has always been entitled to be
protected in the exclusive use and enjoyment of that which is his own.33
The court found that “a violation of the right of privacy is a direct invasion of
a legal right of the individual. It is a tort, and it is not necessary that special
damages should have accrued from its violation in order to entitle the
aggrieved party to recover.”34
In 1960, William Lloyd Prosser drew upon all post-Pavesich state law
cases and defined four distinct invasion of privacy torts: intrusion upon
seclusion, publicity given to private life, false light publicity, and appropriation
for advantage (“The Four Prosser Torts”).35 The first two of the Prosser Torts,
“intrusion upon seclusion” and “publicity given to private life,” are the least
applicable to harms suffered by deepfake targets.36 The remaining two torts,
“appropriation of name or likeness” and “false light publicity,” on their face,
appear applicable to the privacy threat presented by deepfakes. The former
is committed when “[o]ne . . . appropriates to his own use or benefit the name
or likeness of another[,]”37 while the latter occurs when “[o]ne . . . gives
publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public
in a false light[.]”38 A person is subject to false light liability if: “(a) the false
light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would

33

34

35
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37
38

Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 78 (Ga. 1905) (quoting Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 449 (N.Y. 1902) (Gray, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 73 (citation omitted). The court was reviewing a Georgia statute and held that the publication
of plaintiff’s picture without consent was an invasion of that individual’s right to privacy. Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B-E (AM. L. INST. 1977). The Second Restatement was
published after Prosser’s death in 1972, but was based on his work in 1960. William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
An “intrusion upon seclusion” committed when “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns . . . , if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 35, at § 652B. “Publicity given to private life” involves “[o]ne who gives publicity to a
matter concerning the private life of another . . . , if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.” Id. §
652D.
Id. § 652C.
Id. § 652E.
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be placed.”39 Before bringing a claim for any of these torts, a plaintiff must
show injury in fact that is particularized (specific to them) and concrete (an
actual harm or risk of harm); the injury must also be traceable to the
defendant’s conduct and redressable.40
The problem with these privacy tort protections, however, is that they are
vulnerable to a First Amendment defense that deepfakes are protected speech,
rendering them potentially useless against the unique privacy harms presented
by deepfakes.41 Under the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.”42 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
recognized the right to free speech, specifically the public’s interest in freedom
of expression in the area of public matters and public figures, as a defense in
tort actions:
“Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts
have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid
restrictions on their constitutional rights of speech and press. It matters not
that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only
. . . . The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but,
whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.”43

After Sullivan, the First Amendment became a go-to defense against tort
actions that penalized free speech.44 In addition to those who make tortious
statements, parties that disseminate false information, such as news outlets,

39
40

41

42
43
44

Id.
See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (further defining standing requirements for
privacy torts as requiring that they be plead with particularity and describe concrete harms).
See George C. Christie, The Uneasy and Often Unhelpful Interaction of Tort Law and Constitutional
Law in First Amendment Litigation, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1003, 1003–04 (2015) (discussing “increasing
tensions between the First Amendment and the common law torts of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, defamation, and privacy”); see also Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable
Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1711, 1711–14 (2010) (arguing that Prosser’s Four
Privacy Torts are weak in practice and do not effectively remedy harms for a significant portion of
the U.S. citizenry, most specifically LGBTQ individuals).
U.S. CONST. amend I.
N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (citations omitted).
See James M. Beck, How the First Amendment Affects Tort Law, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 14, 2012),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1b0cef82-2385-42a0-9631-8a3846724833
(explaining how the First Amendment and other federal law often poses a viable defense to any tort
claim that undermines free speech).
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can raise a First Amendment defense to defeat liability.45 Courts consider the
act of awarding money damages for a tort claim involving free speech or
expression a “direct regulation on speech.”46 In United States v. Alvarez, the
Supreme Court explained that
‘the First Amendment means that [the] government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.” As a result, the Constitution “demands that content-based
restrictions on speech be presumed invalid . . . and that the Government
bear the burden of showing their constitutionality.’”47
The defense extends to other torts, such as defamation (libel and slander)
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, which could otherwise offer
plaintiffs some redress.48 For example, the Sullivan case involved libel or
written defamation.49 By extending First Amendment protection to libel, the
Sullivan court overturned nearly 200 years of precedent holding that
defamation is not protected under the First Amendment.50 Moreover, in
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Supreme Court employed the Sullivan
standard to defeat liability in an infliction of emotional distress claim.51 In
Hustler Magazine, an advertisement “parody” described a well-known
minister as losing his virginity “during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with
his mother in an outhouse.”52 The Court concluded that additional proof of

45

46

47

48

49

50

51
52

See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–78 (1986) (discussing how the First
Amendment abrogates the common law presumption that defamatory public speech regarding
private persons is false).
See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 792 (3d Cir. 1999)
(discussing the negative impact on free speech if protected expression could lead to civil liability and
damages).
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716–17 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 573, 660 (2004)).
A statement is defamatory if it “tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35, at § 559. Infliction of emotional distress claims
require a showing that the defendant’s conduct was “extreme” or “outrageous.” Id. § 46. For a more
comprehensive review of cases recognizing the First Amendment defense in various forms of tort
litigation, see supra note 44.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256–57 (1964) (explaining the elements of libel via
case-specific facts).
See id. at 264–65 (holding that the First Amendment can be a viable defense to a libel claim involving
matters of public concern).
Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–52 (1988).
Id. at 48.
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falsity with actual malice was necessary “to give adequate ‘breathing space’ to
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment” when the speech involves
public figures or matters of public concern.53
The actual malice standard can make it incredibly difficult for a plaintiff in
a tort case involving a public figure or public matter, even if the case is between
two private parties.54 A plaintiff can establish “actual malice” by proving that
the defendant knew or acted with reckless disregard as to the falsity of a
statement.55 But this assumes that a plaintiff can identity the deepfake creator.
Absent an identifiable defendant, a plaintiff may only be able to pursue a thirdparty disseminator of the deepfake (i.e. a news agency or social media
platform). A third party that disseminates defamatory information, however,
may not have actual knowledge or reckless disregard for a statement’s falsity,
which may become increasingly harder to prove as deepfakes become more
convincing.56 In addition, courts have yet to thoroughly address what could
constitute a “matter of public concern” or a “public figure” in the age of social
media and deepfakes. For example, someone who a decade ago may have
been considered a private figure may, in 2020, have thousands of followers
and subscribers (both nationally and internationally) on social media or
YouTube, respectively. Would they be a public figure? Would information
about them be a matter of public concern? Right now, a public figure can be
someone who merely thrusts themselves into the public eye and invites
comment or criticism.57 If and how this definition evolves upon the advent of
53
54

55

56

57

Id. at 53, 56.
See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80 (establishing the First Amendment defense to liability and
“actual malice” standard regarding a public figure and a private newspaper).
See Hustler Mag., Inc., 485 U.S. at 53, 56. The “actual malice” standard (requiring proof that the
defendant knew or acted with reckless disregard as to the falsity of a statement) may be easily proven
against a deepfake creator that intentionally alters the original or true depictions of a private party.
Id. But see infra note 56 (explaining how third parties that contribute to the spread of the defamatory
information are unlikely to be liable as deepfakes become more convincing).
This is especially likely considering that online media platforms with high content volume cannot
remove defamatory information with the discernment required under the First Amendment, even
when they are notified about a statement’s falsity. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
333 (4th Cir. 1997) (referencing First Amendment concerns in broadly interpreting a federal statutory
provision that immunizes online service providers from tort liability for information posted on their
websites by third parties).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 351 (1974) (holding that:
[T]hose classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. An individual may
achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes
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more convincing deepfake technologies could severely impact tort remedies
for deepfake targets.58
Moreover, a plaintiff’s ability to engage in counter speech could
undermine their tort claim.59 While this expectation is imposed against
governments more than often than private parties, 60 it sets a discouraging
precedent for individuals defamed in deepfake videos. It overestimates the
power of counter speech, especially considering the realistic and pervasive
nature of deepfake technology. American comedian and director, Jordan
Peele, created a deepfake of former U.S. President, Barack Obama, to
demonstrate how easily deepfakes can be believed and disseminated on the
Internet.61 Global social media platforms like Twitter, Instagram, YouTube,
and Facebook serve as ultra-efficient channels for deepfake creators to share
their deepfakes with millions of individuals worldwide.62 For these reasons,
courts’ consideration of counter speech, even regarding public figures and
governments, significantly undermines tort remedies. This is especially true
when considering that, even if an individual is successful in proving that a video

58

59

60

61

62

and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn
into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range
of issues.).
See Ellyn M. Angelotti, Twibel Law: What Defamation and Its Remedies Look Like in the Age of
Twitter, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 430, 432 (2013) (discussing unanswered questions on how the public
figure and actual malice doctrines apply in the age of social media, specifically Twitter); see also
Deven R. Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure Doctrine, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 455, 456–59 (2013) (explaining the public figure doctrine as it relates to corporations and
advocating for a specific corporate public figure doctrine).
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 726 (2012) (striking down a federal statute against false
speech because, in part, the government failed to show why counter speech or refutation could not
“overcome the lie”); see also N.Y. Times Co, 376 U.S. at 278–79 (holding that false speech enjoys
constitutional protection insofar as its prohibition would chill truthful speech).
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 726–28 (discussing the government’s ability to disprove whether an
individual has won a military medal of honor).
Kaylee Fagan, A Viral Video That Appears to Show Obama Calling Trump a ‘dips--’ Shows a
Disturbing New Trend Called ‘Deepfakes ,’ BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 17, 2018, 4:48 PM)
https://www.businessinsider.com/obama-deepfake-video-insulting-trump-2018-4.
See, e.g., How is Fake News Spread? Bots, People like You, Trolls, and Microtargeting , CTR. FOR
INFO. TECH. & SOC’Y, https://www.cits.ucsb.edu/fake-news/spread (last visited Oct. 31, 2020)
(explaining how “bots,” microtargeting, trolls, and people in general are used to spread fake content
on social media).
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is fake (i.e. the case of Indian journalist, Rana Ayyub), the reputational,
emotional, and economic harm may already be done.63
For these reasons, the First Amendment is widely invoked to protect
speech, authors who create it, and entities that disseminate it, from tort liability
for injuries allegedly caused by such ideas.64 Those same protections, however,
can nearly extinguish tort remedies that would otherwise offer victims of
injurious deepfakes at least some redress for their harms.

B. Copyright Law
Copyright law also fails to provide a remedy for those victimized by
deepfakes because deepfake creators are likely to succeed in arguing a First
Amendment fair use defense to copyright protection. Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the Constitution secures for a limited time “to [a]uthors and
[i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and
[d]iscoveries[.]”65 If a plaintiff captured photos or video that was later
transposed into a deepfake, they would have copyright ownership of the
original media.66
A deepfake, however, is likely a transformative work or parody under
Section 107 of the Copyright Act, rending a plaintiff unlikely to defeat a fair
use defense. Fair use of a copyrighted work is allowed for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.67 In
determining whether use in any case is fair, the courts must consider the
following factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and

63

64
65
66

67

See Harwell, supra note 5 (describing emotional and physical distress caused by a pornographic
deepfake).
See Beck, supra note 44 (arguing that the First Amendment defense is widely employed in tort law).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (commonly referred to as the “Copyright Clause”).
Douglas Harris, Deepfakes: False Pornography Is Here and the Law Cannot Protect You , 17 DUKE
L. & TECH. REV. 99, 107 n.57 (2019).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.68

The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the fourth factor is the most
important factor in the fair use analysis.69 The fair use analysis involves a
“sensitive balancing of interests” between factors, requiring that the factors be
weighted together.70 Thus, the first and fourth factors are often combined to
evaluate the commerciality of a creator’s work and whether it interferes with
the market value of the original.71 But under factor three, “the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors,
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”72 Therefore,
even if a deepfake creator is selling a nonconsensual deepfake containing
copyrighted images, the creator would still be likely to succeed in a fair use
defense if the deepfake is transformative under the third factor.
A new work that merely copies the essential physical or nonphysical
qualities of an original work, copies the heart of the work and is not
transformative.73 Parodies are transformative by humorously criticizing a
former work and providing some social benefit.74 While deepfakes concerning
public figures or matters of public concern are likely to be considered
parodies, pornographic deepfakes are not for lack of commentary on an
underlying work or expression.75 A new work can still be transformative,
however, even if it is not a parody. Transforming an original work into
something new with different purpose or character can satisfy the third
element.76 Unfortunately for plaintiffs, deepfakes are the epitome of using a

68
69

70
71
72
73

74
75

76

Id.
See Harper & Row, Publishers. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (stating that “the Act
focuses on ‘the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work[,]’
the last factor, is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use” (footnote omitted)).
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 n.32, 455 n.40 (1984).
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 at 602-03 (1985).
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 627–30 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
schoolteacher’s publishing of six full-length, copyrighted standardized exams to critique them used
too much of each exam).
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (defining parody and distinguishing it from mere mockery).
Compare Harris, supra note 66, at 108–09 (detailing why “personal” pornographic deepfakes are
likely unprotected by parody law), with Jessica Ice, Note, Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the
First Amendment, 70 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 417, 435 (2019) (discussing the vitality of parody as a
defense to deepfake creators using public figures or commenting on public matters).
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587–88.
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previous copyrighted work (i.e. a picture or video) and transforming it into
something wildly different from the purpose or character of the original work.77
Therefore, copyright law is not a promising source of redress for those
victimized by nonconsensual deepfake creations.

C. Right of Publicity Law
In addition to the challenges First Amendment protections pose to
individuals seeking redress under state tort law, right of publicity laws require
showings that make it difficult for plaintiffs to recover for the nonconsensual
use of their image or likeness. The right of publicity protects the economic
value of a person’s likeness or image; it is very broad and generally extends
past death.78 Right of publicity laws are rooted in state-level privacy laws, but
they are often considered an intellectual property protection because of their
focus on commerciality.79 The tension between classifying the right of publicity
as a property or privacy protection makes it difficult for lawmakers to draft
strong right of publicity protections.80 And, like the privacy torts discussed
above, they are only recognized on the state, not federal, level.81
While a legitimate right of publicity claim can defeat a fair use defense, 82
requiring a plaintiff to prove the economic value of their image to secure a
remedy is a significant barrier to non-famous plaintiffs. For example, in White
v. Samsung, Vanna White sued Samsung for an advertisement depicting a
robot resembling the “Wheel of Fortune” host.83 White was ultimately
unsuccessful on her right to privacy claim under California law, but she
77

78

79

80

See Harwell, supra note 5 (noting that deepfakes “are effectively new creations, meaning they could
be protected as free speech”).
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, §
1:2 (2d ed. 2020).
See id. (footnote omitted) (“The right of publicity grew historically out of the state law right of privacy.
Today, all states recognize some aspect of the right of privacy, either at common law or by statute.”).
Joshua L. Simmons & Miranda D. Means, Split Personality: Constructing a Coherent Right of
Publicity Statute, A.B.A. (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/pub
lications/landslide/2017-18/may-june/split-personality/.

81

Id.

82

Many states require the plaintiff to prove that a defendant’s alleged use is not transformative of the
plaintiff’s likeness or image. See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a video game developer’s use of the
likenesses of college athletes in its video games was not transformative and thus not protected by the
First Amendment).
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992).

83
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succeeded after appeal on her right of publicity claim.84 In reversing the lower
court’s finding on White’s right of publicity claim, the court reasoned that
“[a]lthough the defendants in these cases avoided the most obvious means of
appropriating the plaintiff’s identities [sic], each of their actions directly
implicated the commercial interests which the right of publicity is designed to
protect.”85 The court also explicitly rejected the defendant’s First Amendment
parody defense, arguing that the defendant’s spoof of White was only
“tangentially related” to the ad’s primary purpose of persuading viewers to buy
Samsung products and holding that “[t]he difference between a ‘parody’ and
a ‘knock-off’ is the difference between fun and profit.”86
The average U.S. citizen, however, may not have the social leverage to
argue that their likeness is being appropriated without consent or
compensation. As the Court in White stated,
[t]he right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial interest of
celebrities in their identities. The theory of the right is that a celebrity’s
identity can be valuable in the promotion of products, and the celebrity has
an interest that may be protected from the unauthorized commercial
exploitation of that identity.87

This was also a concern in In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litigation, in which the court held that a video game developer’s use
of the likenesses of college athletes in its video games was not protected by the
First Amendment.88 And, therefore, a former college football player’s right of
publicity claims against the developer were not barred by California law. 89
While In re NCAA was a step in the right direction toward protecting uberfamous individuals, the decision was still rooted in economically-focused
intellectual property law, which fails to capture the more nuanced privacy
harms done the average citizen. For these reasons, the right of publicity also
falls short of comprehensively addressing nonconsensual deepfakes.

84

85
86
87

88
89

See id. at 1400–02 (overturning the lower court’s ruling regarding White’s right of publicity and
Lanham Act claims).
Id. at 1398.
Id. at 1401.
Id. at 1398 (alteration in original) (quoting Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d
831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983)).
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d at 1284.
See id. (“Under California’s transformative use defense, [defendant’s] use of the likenesses of college
athletes like Samuel Keller in its video games is not, as a matter of law, protected by the First
Amendment.”).
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D. Criminal Revenge Porn and Nonconsensual Pornography Law
“Revenge porn” or nonconsensual pornography statutes were created
almost as a direct response to the proliferation of individuals’ personal photos
and videos on the Internet without their consent.90 There are two types of
revenge porn laws. The first is a “narrower” type that “prohibits distributing
sexually explicit images of another without the other person’s consent . . . with
the intent to harm.”91 This type of offense usually arises when an individual is
seeking revenge against a former intimate partner by “sharing sexually explicit
images that the individual obtained during the period of their intimacy,” even
if the image was originally taken with the subject’s consent.92 The second type
of revenge porn is broader and prohibits “distributing sexually explicit images
of another without the other person’s consent, even [if] the distribution is not
done with the intent to harm.”93 This broader criminal offense recognizes a
right to control images of oneself in intimate settings.94
Currently, there is no remedy under federal law for adult victims of
nonconsensual pornography.95 Federal invasion of privacy laws do not apply
to deepfakes because they require the unlawful intercepting, obtaining, or
accessing of a person’s electronic, telephone, or Internet communications.96
And while there are federal protections for obscenity,97 the Supreme Court has
issued conflicting decisions on how to define “obscene,” which calls into
question the doctrine’s integrity and applicability to Internet crimes.98

90

91
92
93
94
95

96

97

98

See State Revenge Porn Policy, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/state-policy/revenge-porn/
(last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (articulating states’ interest in creating revenge porn and nonconsensual
pornography statutes).
ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 245–47 (4th ed. 2018).

Id.
Id.
Id.
See State Revenge Porn Policy, supra note 90 (“Currently, federal law does not provide a remedy to
victims of nonconsensual pornography . . . .”).
KERR, supra note 91, at 248 (detailing the elements of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511; Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701; and Pen Register Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3121).
KERR, supra note 91, at 264, 275, 279 (explaining the obscenity standard established in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) and preexisting federal obscenity statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1460–70).
KERR, supra note 91, at 273 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003), undermined the obscenity doctrine).
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As a result, 46 states, the District of Columbia, and Guam have enacted
revenge porn laws.99 These laws, however, align more with the narrower type
of revenge porn that requires the person distributing the images to have an
intent to harm the subject of the images or video.100 These laws can also require
the subject to have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the images for
the distributor to be criminally liable.101 Additionally, several of these laws
require the media at issue to include the “intimate” areas or parts of the
targeted individual, which usually means the “unclothed genital areas.”102
All of these requirements are barriers to redress for those targeted in
nonconsensual deepfake pornography. First, the limited application of
revenge porn laws is particularly concerning regarding pornographic
deepfakes because a deepfake creator may not intend to hurt the subject of
their depictions. Deepfake creators that share their productions among
friends or online without harmful intent would not be criminally liable in states
with intent-to-harm requirements.103 Second, a deepfake producer could easily
utilize photos and/or video from a targeted individual’s social media accounts
to create highly offensive deepfakes. A defendant deepfake producer could
argue successfully that someone does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in media they publish online themselves. And finally, given that
deepfakes are usually created by superimposing images of people’s faces onto
other images, a deepfake will rarely involve images or video of the targeted
individual’s actual intimate areas. Thus, revenge porn and nonconsensual
pornography criminal statutes fail as an effective remedy for both public and
private individuals depicted in nonconsensual deepfakes.

99

100

101

102
103

46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws , CYBER CIV. RTS. I NITIATIVE,
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited December 4, 2020).
At least twenty-five state jurisdictions contain a culpability requirement that the individual must intend
to cause harm to the other individual by disseminating the sexually explicit photograph or video.
Harris, supra note 66, at 121; see, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.120 (West 2018) (requiring intent
to cause harm); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-64-3 (2020) (requires “knowledge or reckless disregard for
the likelihood that the depicted person will suffer harm”).
At least sixteen state jurisdictions have a reasonable expectation of privacy requirements. See 46
States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws , supra note 99 (providing an overview
of all the state statutes that have revenge porn laws); see also Harris, supra note 66, at 121–22
(describing the expectation of privacy language used in different state statutes); see also MINN. STAT.
§ 617.261 (2019) (requiring the subject to have a reasonable expectation of privacy).
Harris, supra note 66, at 122.
See Harris, supra note 66, at 121 (“The Producers that share deepfakes amongst friends or post
online without any harmful intent are not criminally liable.).
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E. Criminal Harassment and Threat Law
Federal law generally prohibits threats and harassment.104 Laws against
threats and harassment that are most likely to apply to nonconsensual
deepfake creators include cyberstalking and cyberbullying laws. Threats and
harassment, however, are just as limited as their counterparts in revenge porn
law.

1. Cyberstalking
18 U.S.C. § 2261A (more commonly known as the federal “Cyberstalking
Statute”) requires the defendant to have engaged in qualified stalking behavior
or know that their behavior would cause serious harm to the individuals
depicted in their deepfakes.105 Like the limitations imposed by the intent
requirement of other U.S. laws, it does not address the harm done to
individuals based on the mere dissemination of a deepfake containing their
image because of its focus on the creator’s knowledge or intent.
For example, Selena Gomez, a famous American singer and performer,
was depicted in a pornographic deepfake that quickly went viral in mid-2019.106
A quick Google search returns tens of results to websites hosting one or more
deep fake creations featuring Gomez that are incredibly arduous and difficult
to remove, especially for the average individual. Under the Cyberstalking
Statute’s current language, a creator could easily establish that they could not
have foreseen death or serious bodily injury to Gomez or her loved ones when
they created the fake. Similarly, in the case of Rana Ayyub,107 that deepfake
creator would likely succeed in arguing that Ayyub’s physical suffering and

104

105

106

107

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2018) (prohibiting extortion or any threat of injury to the property or
reputation of another, including threats of kidnapping, in interstate communication).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2018) (prohibiting the use of “any interactive computer service or electronic
communication system of interstate commerce” to engage in activities “with the intent to kill, injure,
harass, intimidate . . . another person” and behavior that the actor knows would place another person
“in reasonable fear of the death of or serious bodily injury to a person . . . .”).
See Charlotte Walsh, What is a deepfake? This video technology is spooking some politicians , USA
TODAY, (May 6, 2020, 8:14 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/03/15/whatdeepfake-video-technology-spooking-some-politicians/3109263002/ (using the Selena Gomez
deepfake to foreshadow how the technology could be used against politicians).
See Harwell, supra note 5 (discussing the physical and emotional harm suffered by an Indian
journalist, Rana Ayyub, after she was featured in a deepfake without her consent).
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hospital visits were entirely unforeseeable when they made the deepfake.108
Therefore, cyberstalking laws do not provide a remedy for individuals
depicted in a majority of nonconsensual deepfakes, in which physical harm to
the targeted individual is not intended.

2. Cyberbullying
Virtually every state has “cyberbullying” or electronic harassment laws that
were created to protect children from physical and electronic bullying.109 What
constitutes the most accurate definition of “cyberbullying” is a debatable
topic.110 A commonly used definition, however, is “speech that is ‘defamatory,
constitutes bullying, harassment, or discrimination, discloses personal
information, or contains offensive, vulgar, or derogatory comments.’”111 Most
definitions encompass forms of bullying that use technology.112
These laws are often struck down as too broad when expanded to include
advancing technologies.113 For example, in People v. Marquan, the New York
Court of Appeals found that a local law prohibiting cyberbullying against “any
minor or person” or children in the county was overbroad under the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.114 Furthermore, most anticyberbullying and harassment laws, even if they do not have intent or
knowledge requirements, do not capture the “intense” form of harassment
deepfakes can generate.115

108
109

110

111
112
113

114
115

Id.
See Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Bullying Laws, CYBERBULLYING RSCH. CTR.,
https://cyberbullying.org/Bullying-and-Cyberbullying-Laws.pdf (last updated Nov. 2018) (categorizing
cyberbullying and harassment laws across the U.S.).
See SHAHEEN SHARIFF, CONFRONTING CYBER-BULLYING: WHAT SCHOOLS NEED TO KNOW TO
CONTROL MISCONDUCT AND AVOID LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 39–40 (2009) (discussing the overly
simplistic nature of some “cyberbullying” definitions and the resulting inability of cyberbullying
measures to address cyberbullying harms).
Id. at 41.

Id.
See Sameer Hinduja & Justin Patchin, State Bullying Laws, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR.
(2008), https://cyberbullying.org/Bullying-and-Cyberbullying-Laws.pdf (analyzing the clash between
cyberbullying laws and the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines).
People v. Marquan M.,19 N.E.3d 480, 488 (N.Y. 2014).
See Owen Bowcott, Criminal law not keeping pace with digital world – report, GUARDIAN (Oct. 31,
2018, 8:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/nov/01/criminal-law-not-keeping-pacewith-digital-world-report (“At present the criminal law does not treat [‘pile on’] abuse as an intense
form of harassment. Future reforms could consider whether the conduct associated with ‘pile on”

228

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:1

For these reasons, U.S. law is severely lacking in legal recourse for those
victimized by nonconsensual deepfake productions. Emerging laws, such as
the Defending Each and Every Person from False Appearances by Keeping
Exploitation Subject to Accountability Act (the DEEP FAKES Accountability
Act), set out to address the specific harms presented by nonconsensual
deepfakes.116 Until those measures are passed and survive First Amendment
scrutiny, however, most targeted individuals will remain vulnerable. Analyzing
U.S. privacy law’s longstanding connectedness to protecting human dignity
and reputation, however, could serve as grounds upon which courts could
shape stronger constitutional privacy protections against nonconsensual
deepfakes. In turn, those victimized by and seeking to regulate deepfakes
could have a better chance at defeating First Amendment challenges.
III. INFERRING STRONGER CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
U.S. privacy law’s root in preserving human or personal dignity provides
some justification for courts to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to
autonomy as protecting the unique harms caused by deepfakes. While the
right to autonomy is most often applied to one’s physical control over their
own body, connecting the privacy protection it to its broader origins in
safeguarding personal dignity could justify a constitutional privacy protection
that rivals the First Amendment. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court
traditionally avoids balancing competing constitutional interests,117 the unique

116

117

harassment’ such as coordinating and inciting this behaviour [sic], could be more effectively
targeted.”).
See Defending Each and Every Person from False Appearances by Keeping Exploitation Subject to
Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. (2019) (illustrating that this bill was introduced
by Rep. Yvette D. Clarke (D-NY-9) and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the
Committees on Energy and Commerce, and Homeland Security in June 2019); see also Devin
Coldewey, DEEPFAKES Accountability Act would impose unenforceable rules —
but it’s a start, TECH C RUNCH (June 13, 2019, 3:25 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/13/deepf
akes-accountability-act-would-impose-unenforceable-rules-but-its-a-start/ (arguing that even the
DEEPFAKES Accountability Act may not provide a sufficient remedy because the law would
“require anyone creating a piece of synthetic media imitating a person to disclose that the video is
altered or generated, using ‘irremovable digital watermarks, as well as textual descriptions’” and
because it would establish “a right on the part of victims of synthetic media to sue the creators and/or
otherwise ‘vindicate their reputations’ in court").
See Doron M. Kalir, The Need for Principled Balancing When Constitutional Values Collide,
SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Nov. 16, 2018), https://scholars.org/brief/need-principled-
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threat deepfakes pose to the integrity of public discourse itself, in addition to
the reputational harm it causes targeted individuals, may compel the Court’s
attention.118

A. U.S. Privacy Law’s Origins in Protecting Human Dignity
Over the course of U.S. history, “the notion that every individual is entitled
to the requisites of human dignity has been honored more in the abstract than
in legal action.”119 In developing privacy tort law, however, U.S. legal scholars
and courts were heavily influenced by the German right of personality.120 In
analyzing the sources that Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis utilized in
Right to Privacy,121 Paul M. Schwartz and Karl-Nikolaus Peifer state that:
[Warren and Brandeis] considered continental law, in particular, French
copyright law and the nascent French right of privacy. At a key point in their
argument, however, they turned, somewhat suddenly, to a concept from
German philosophy: the right of personality. To some extent at least,
Brandeis had been exposed to German thought through his family
background, its cultural milieu, and his own education. Brandeis was born in
Louisville, Kentucky to a family with German roots, and one that returned for
business reasons to Germany while he was a teenager. Brandeis then spent
three semesters, from 1873 to 1875, at the Annen-Realschule in Dresden.
Warren and Brandeis drew on the concept of a personality interest to
develop their right of privacy as more than a new property right. Of their
‘right to be let alone,’ Warren and Brandeis first noted its similarity with
interests in being free from assault, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, and defamation.122

118

119

120

121

122

balancing-when-constitutional-values-collide (suggesting that the Supreme Court avoids employing
the constitutional balancing measures that are often used in other countries).
But see Chesney & Citron, supra note 1, at 1803.” (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982)
(“[T]he ‘State’s fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a
compelling justification for limiting speech.’ Not surprisingly, courts therefore have struck down
periodic attempts to ban election-related lies. The entry of deep fakes into the mix will not likely
change that result).
Kenneth S. Abraham & Edward White, The Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts , 104 CORNELL L. REV.
317, 319 (2019).
See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser’s Privacy and the German Right of Personality:
Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept? , 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1925, 1937 (2010)
(discussing the German influence on U.S. tort privacy law).
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213 (1890)
(advocating for a U.S. right to privacy).
Id. at 1943 (footnotes omitted).
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The German right of personality is rooted in the idea that privacy law
should protect against the degradation of human dignity.123 Initially,
throughout the early 1900s, the German Federal Supreme Court and Federal
Constitutional Court were reluctant to allow the legal protection of
personality.124 In addition, many legal commentators in Germany rejected the
personality right as “too broad and vague to become part of the law.”125 After
the horrors inflicted by Hitler and the German state, however, German courts
opened up to the concept of protecting personality and dignity by enacting
Germany’s Basic Law and the Civil Code, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Basic
Law).126 “The Basic Law grants protection of dignity to all humans . . . due to
their unique individual status rather than their racial identity. The Basic Law
also declares in its critical Article 1(1) that human dignity is ‘inviolable,’ which
means that the State cannot take it away or destroy it.”127
Over time, German federal courts strengthened privacy protections by
rooting them in the dignity of the individual.128 In a groundbreaking case,
Schacht, the Federal Supreme Court held that German citizens have a “right
of personality,” defined as “the right of the individual to be respected in his
dignity as a human being and to develop his individual personality.”129 Later,
in 1958, the Federal Supreme Court identified a damage remedy for
personality rights in the German Civil Code.130 The Federal Constitutional
Court finally ratified the Federal Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the right

123

124

125
126
127
128

129

130

See id. at 1946 (stating that there would be a “real difference [in U.S. privacy law] if ‘the tort of
invasion of privacy [were] taken to protect the dignity of man’ as opposed to Prosser’s four tort
interests.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1004 (1964))).
See id. at 1947–48 (“German courts throughout the early 1900s were also reluctant to allow the legal
protection of personality, apart from certain statutorily protected interests, such as the interests
safeguarded through copyright law.”).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1950.
Id.;
see

also
CHRISTIAN
BUMKE,
ANDREAS
VOSSKUHLE,
CASEBOOK
VOSSKUHLE/VERFASSUNGSRECHT 76–84 (5th ed. 2008) (detailing developments in German privacy
rights post-WWII).
Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 120, at 1950 (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGHZ] [Federal Court of
Justice] May 25, 1954, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 334 (1954) (Ger) (translated in
German Law Archive, https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=108).
Id. at 1951 (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGHZ] [Federal Court of Justice] Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift [NJW]349 (1958) (Ger) ( translated in German Law Archive,
https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=113).
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of personality in the 1973 case, Soraya.131 And today, the German courts’
decisions on the right of personality are “uniformly accepted.”132
Prosser “stripped” the high-level, German-influenced concepts from
Warren and Brandeis’ writings to begin constructing the Four Prosser Torts,
and, at that time, most other authors “rallied around the notion of the right of
personality as the basis for a privacy tort.”133 When Prosser released his four
categories, however, U.S. privacy and tort law “halted at the lines that [Prosser]
drew.”134 While Prosser’s four categories provided some clarity on issues of
privacy law, it obscured the right to personality’s classification as fundamental
right under U.S. common law. Meanwhile, the superior “constitutional
dimension” of German privacy tort law continued to safeguard “an absolutely
protected sphere that is typically associated with highly intimate information
or extremely sensitive aspects of private life.”135 As Schwartz and Peifer state:
a unitary value grounded in the fundamental worth of human dignity has led
to the protection of more interests than those covered by Prosser’s four
privacy torts . . . . At the same time, moreover, the German emphasis on the
protection of dignity has not led to radically weaker protection for the freedom
of expression. The German right of personality permits publication of
newsworthy matters and strong criticisms of others that impinge on privacy.136

Thus, in concurrence with Schwartz and Peifer, instead of scrapping the
Prosser Torts entirely, U.S. legal scholars and judges should continue
analyzing and interpreting privacy protections with the historical link to a
German unitary concept of human dignity in mind.137 Specifically, courts
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See Schwartz & Piefer, supra note 120, at 1951 n.179 (“[t]he systems of values of the Basic Law finds
its focal point in the free human personality and his dignity, which develops in the social community.
It is due respect and protection from all points of governmental power (Art. 1 and 2 para. 1 GG).
Such protection extends to the private sphere of humans, the sector in which a person can remain
alone, to reach decisions in his own responsibility, and to be free from invasions of all kinds[.]”
(quoting Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 14, 1973, Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 269 (1973))).
Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 120, at 1952.
Id. at 1944; see also id. (“[Prosser] transposed Warren and Brandeis’s work into a comfortable
middle range, one light on theory but heavy on doctrinal distinctions for judges and practitioners to
follow.”).
Id. at 1946; see also id. at 1944 (“For many years after Warren and Brandeis’s contribution, other
authors on the subject of privacy also rallied around the notion of the right of personality as the basis
for a privacy tort. The sway of this idea remained unchallenged . . . until Prosser introduced his fourpart classification.”).
Id. at 1986–87.
Id. at 1947.
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should view the reputation and personality tort principles underpinning U.S.
defamation law as central, rather than tangential, to U.S. privacy law generally.
Recognizing this history could be the first step in acknowledging the
fundamental importance of protecting one’s personality and how the bulk of
U.S. privacy law was conceived for that exact purpose. Only then may courts
consider how First Amendment limitations on privacy laws pose a significant
threat to the most basic interests of U.S. citizens—as exemplified by the
deepfake dilemma.

B. The Link Between the Constitutional Right of Autonomy and Protecting
Human Dignity
A reinforced constitutional right to privacy that encompasses the human
dignity factor protected under German constitutional law could be inferred
from the right of autonomy under the 14th Amendment. It is important,
however, to first explore how U.S. privacy tort law can be elevated to a
constitutional protection of human dignity when, unlike in German law, the
protection is not explicitly stated in the Constitution or its case law progeny.
Indeed, where a significant interest or right is not included in the Constitution
explicitly, the Constitution can be amended to include an explicit provision,
or the right can be interpreted from existing constitutional protections. This
comment address the latter approach.
The Supreme Court has showcased frequently its ability to interpret “a
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy”
in lieu of an explicit right in the Constitution.138 Most notably, in Roe v. Wade,
the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
creates a fundamental “right to privacy” that protects a woman’s decision to
have an abortion.139 It held further that that right must be balanced against the
government’s interest in protecting women’s health and potential human life.140
The Court achieved this by piecing together various constitutional protections
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). The Supreme Court held in Roe that the “right of privacy
. . . founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.” Id. at 153.
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Id.
Id. at 153–54; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871–73 (1992)
(modifying the balancing inquiry in Roe but maintaining the right to abortion).
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and common law rights that, together, manifested an implicit right.141 But only
personal rights deemed “fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”142
The right of autonomy was established, and is most often discussed, in
reproductive rights and justice cases. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the
court held that:
Our precedents have respected the private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter. These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept

of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
The right of autonomy emphasizes the importance of protecting one’s own
bodily interests, including the “concept of existence” and “personal dignity.”144
Thus, the right of autonomy is directly linked to protecting personal or human
dignity as a fundamental right—the root of Germany’s constitutional right to
personality and the common law origin of U.S. privacy protections. For this
reason, the Court could reasonably bolster existing privacy tort protections
with constitutional authority.
143

Furthermore, the Court would be similarly authorized to interpret the right
of autonomy to include non-bodily dignity interests or interests not involving
the physical invasion of one’s person. As stated in Casey, “choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”145 The “concept of existence” is also at the heart of
liberty.146 Furthermore, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court held that liberty is
“not merely freedom from bodily restraint” but includes other privileges that
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See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53 (explaining how different constitutional provisions and common law
rights have led to the Court recognizing an implicit right to privacy); see also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965) (analyzing the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to
create the right to privacy in marital relations); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 541–42 (1942) (finding a privacy right to procreate); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54
(1972) (finding a privacy right to contraception).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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have been “long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men[,]” such as the rights to contract and learn.147
The privacy interests threatened by nonconsensual deepfakes are nonbodily dignity interests that could be protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right “to
define one’s own concept of existence,”148 and nothing is more central to one’s
own concept of existence than their personality and reputation.
Nonconsensual deepfakes deprive individuals of their autonomous right to
build their own personality and reputation, especially when they depict
individuals engaged in conduct that they, or any reasonable person, would find
highly offensive. And like the rights to contract and learn, one’s interest in
protecting their reputation or personality, for private parties in particular, is
long recognized in case law.149
Moreover, it is well understood that the Fourteenth Amendment limits
state and government action only and cannot be invoked against private
parties.150 Nesting the personality harm created by deepfakes in the right to
autonomy, however, would not create a new private right of action against
private parties. Instead, it would establish a constitutional right to defend one’s
own personality and reputation, an interest at the heart of privacy common
law. As a result, the right will bolster a plaintiff’s case against a deepfake
creator who raises a First Amendment defense, increase legislative and
enforcement power against deepfakes, and force courts to engage in a wellreasoned balancing analysis of the competing constitutional interests.
Thus, federal courts could infer a 14th Amendment right to privacy that
encompasses the human dignity factor at the root of U.S. privacy tort law and
German constitutional law. This inference would significantly strengthen
constitutional privacy protections against First Amendment defenses in cases
concerning nonconsensual deepfakes. If the right of autonomy is recognized
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Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
See MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 78, at § 1:20 (outlining cases that have recognized the
right to privacy); see also KERR, supra note 91, at 248 (discussing federal criminal laws that recognize
an individual’s common law right to control images of themself in intimate settings).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”).
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as protecting the dignity interests threatened by deepfakes, then the next step
would be for federal courts to develop an analytical mechanism for balancing
competing First and Fourteenth Amendment interests.

C. Germany’s Example of Constitutional Balancing
Constitutional courts around the world use constitutional balancing or
“proportionality” as the cornerstone for resolving constitutional conflicts.151
Constitutional proportionality “requires that government intrusions on
freedoms be justified, that greater intrusions have stronger justifications, and
that punishments reflect the relative severity of the offense.”152 The U.S.,
however, has not standardized the practice.153 For example, in Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the first instance where the
U.S. Supreme Court engaged directly with a dispute between two
constitutional rights, the Court declined to engage in constitutional balancing
in favor of deciding the case on technical grounds.154 But fortunately, if the
Court decides to develop a carefully-reasoned balancing formula for lower
courts, legislatures, and rights-advocates to use when considering their own
policies, it would not have to start from scratch.
Germany utilizes constitutional balancing, and it could serve as the perfect
model for U.S. courts, especially when addressing competing First
Amendment and constitutional privacy protections. Not only do the German
and U.S.’s privacy regimes share origins in protecting personal dignity and
autonomy,155 but Germany is also one of the most active countries in the fight
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See Kalir, supra note 117 (listing Canada, Germany, South Africa, France, and Israel as some of the
countries utilizing constitutional balancing).
Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality , 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3094, 311021 (2015).
See id. (arguing that while many areas of U.S. constitutional law include some elements of
proportionality analysis, the U.S. could benefit from a greater use of proportionality principles and
doctrine, especially on issues free speech).
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018) (holding
that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s conduct in assessing a cake shop owner’s reasons for
declining to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated the Free Exercise Clause); see also
Kalir, supra note 117 (discussing the Court’s tendency to decide cases on legal technicalities rather
can addressing constitutional conflicts head-on).
See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 120, at 1972–81 (detailing the common origins of U.S. and
German privacy law).
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against offensive uses of viral deception.156 U.S. courts could adopt or modify
the “significant impact” analysis employed by German courts to evaluate
competing but equal constitutional interests. In Generalverbot, a 2009
German Federal Supreme Court case, the court relied upon the “significant
impact” requirement to weigh the pros and cons of publishing photos of the
children of Franz Beckenbauer, “a famous and successful soccer player[,]
coach, and businessman.”157 In Generalverbot, the court acknowledged that
“[t]he question of the permissibility of the publication of a picture requires in
every individual case a weighing of the information interest of the public and
the interest of the pictured party in the protection of his private sphere.”158
While ultimately finding that “a predominant interest in the information is . . .
affirmed,”159 the underlying interest in preserving human dignity and privacy
allowed the court to engage in a comprehensive balancing inquiry that is more
difficult under the free speech protections of the First Amendment.160 While
First Amendment protections create stringent actual malice requirements in
defamation cases involving public figures or public matters, German courts, as
in Generalverbot, are empowered to consider the harm done to a plaintiff’s
privacy right in their analysis. Furthermore, establishing a bright-line rule for
balancing competing constitutional interests could assist legislators with
crafting deepfake legislation that can survive First Amendment free speech
restrictions.161 Thus, upon surveying existing constitutional proportionality
approaches, such as the “significant impact” test utilized by German courts,
U.S. courts could develop an effective tool for reconciling disputes between
privacy and First Amendment constitutional rights on a case-by-case basis. As
a result, courts and legislatures will be better equipped to tackle unique

156

157
158
159
160

161

See Heidi Tworek & Paddy Leerssen, An Analysis of Germany’s NetzDG Law 1–2 (Transatlantic
Working Grp., Working Paper, 2019), https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/NetzDG_Tworek_
Leerssen_April_2019.pdf (discussing Germany’s Network Enforcement Act ( Netzwerkdurchsetzun
gsgesetz or NetzDG), an international test case in the regulation of defamatory deepfake material).
Federal Supreme Court, 112 GRUR 173, 173–74 (2010).
Id. at 174.
Id. at 175.
See Jackson, supra note 152, at 3094 (discussing the need to employ constitutional balancing to
resolve conflicts involving free speech); see also Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 120, at 1954–55
(providing a detailed explanation of the “significant impact” analysis).
See Defending Each and Every Person from False Appearances by Keeping Exploitation Subject to
Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2019) (granting the Attorney General
with the authority to issue waivers from any requirements or liabilities if the producer demonstrates
that compliance with the law would “impede their ability to engage in otherwise lawful activities
protected by the First Amendment”).
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constitutional challenges, such as the ones presented by nonconsensual
deepfakes.
CONCLUSION
There is an increasing need to protect public and private parties who are
victimized in nonconsensual deepfakes. The First Amendment, however,
poses a significant challenge to the U.S. government’s ability to regulate
nonconsensual deepfakes and individuals’ ability to obtain redress for their
harms. To remedy this issue, federal courts should infer a constitutional right
to defend one’s personality and reputation from the 14th Amendment right of
autonomy. This interpretation would fortify plaintiffs against deepfake
creators and compel courts to define clear rules for balancing competing
constitutional interests. Ultimately, it would create space for lawmakers to
develop more precise and innovative methods for discouraging outrageous
attacks on human dignity while upholding core constitutional ideals.
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